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Abstract 
This study clarifies that the basis on which contracts are established is mutual 
consent, whereby property shall not be taken away from a person without their 
consent. The indication of mutual consent is the apparent wording of offer and 
acceptance under the condition of the absence of coercion that cancels consent. 
This coercion is illegal coercion that is unjust and that unlawfully infringes the 
right of others to exercise free will.  
However, if the opposite occurs, namely, if the right of agreement and consent 
in a contract leads to injustice or harm to others, then achieving both justice and 
consent by using coercion is the right thing to do. This type of coercion aims to 
achieve a rightful purpose that ensures justice and eliminates injustice and 
provides for restitution as well. 




This research addresses the subject of achieving both justice and consent in 
financial transaction contracts and asserts that contracts cannot be valid unless 
mutual consent is reached, which is indicated by the apparent wording. However, 
if there were clear evidence of the absence of consent, such as coercion that 
unlawfully infringes on the right of others to exercise free will, this indicates that 
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the wording of the contract does not truthfully express consent nor indicate it. 
This type of coercion affects the contract; therefore, it is prohibited and 
illegitimate and is considered a commission of injustice against others.  
However, the opposite can occur, where a person does not honor a contract 
whose purpose is to fulfill an obligation that is owed to others, to avoid causing 
harm or damage, or to protect the public interest. In such cases, rightful coercion 
is allowed, and it is considered necessary to achieve justice and consent. 
Islamic Fiqh provides enough evidence and application in branches of 
jurisprudence to make the principle of achieving both justice and consent a 
generally meaningful principle. The legislator gives the just ruler broad authority 
in determining the procedures and the means that he uses to achieve justice and 
the best interest. 
An example of an application of this principle is compelling a 
procrastinating debtor to sell assets to pay back his debt; Fiqh scholars have 
agreed on the legality of coercion to pay the debt. They also have agreed on 
coercion on contracting to pay the debt; however, they have disagreed on a third 
procedure, which is the state’s use of compulsory procuration to sell the property 
of the debtor in order to pay his debt. Fiqh scholars have disagreed on the legality 
of the state’s selling the debtor’s property to pay the debt on his behalf. Whereas 
Abu Ḥanīfa’s opinion was that this procedure is illegal, the majority of scholars 
from the Mālikī, Shafi'I, and Hanbali schools and scholars from Ḥanafī’s School 
considered it legal. 
Abu Ḥanīfa believes that the power of the state over the debtor who has 
assets from a different kind of debt is limited to attempting to compel him to sell 
some of his property himself to pay his debts; however, Abu Ḥanīfa believes that 
the sale of the debtor’s property by the state is an interdiction on the debtor and 
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should not be practiced, because it invalidates his competency, which is 
considered awful. 
The majority of scholars have considered that procrastination by a rich 
debtor is one of the reasons to interdict his money. If his procrastination is proved 
to the judge and his creditors request the judge to sell his assets to pay his debts, 
then the judge can sell some of the debtor’s assets by force to pay the exact 
amount of the debt. 
The paper aims to explain that if the terms of agreement and consent in a 
contracts lead to injustice or harm to others, then achieving both justice and 
consent by using coercion is the right thing to do. This type of coercion is 
intended to achieve a rightful purpose that ensures justice and eliminates 
injustice, and provides for restitution as well.   
The aim of this study is to answer important questions such as these: If 
mutual consent in Islamic jurisprudence is the basic principle in making a 
contract, do we accept it without constraints, or should it be restricted to not 
doing injustice and not causing damage to others? 
If the right of consent leads to injustice or damage, does the judge have the 
right to intervene and force the parties to make and sign the contract to achieve 
a balance between both justice and agreement?  
If the wording of the contract is affected by illegal coercion, is it also 
affected by coercion that has rightful purposes that aim to achieve justice and 
restitution, and does the consent of the legislator in cases of rightful coercion 
replace the consent of the contractors? 
To answer these questions and others, and due to the lack of independent 
research on achieving justice and consent in financial contracts, the researcher 
decided to research this subject as a way to serve Islamic Sharia law.  
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The researcher could not find any research in the literature about the 
achievement of both justice and consent in the context of financial transaction 
contracts; however, there are previous studies that relate to the topic of rights and 
mutual consent:  
1- A master’s thesis entitled “The Impact of Coercion on Financial 
Transaction, Comparative Jurisprudence Study,” prepared by Iyad Ibrahim 
Odeh, supervisor Dr. Mazen Sabah, al-Azhar University, Gaza, 1433 H\ 
2012 AD. 
2- A paper entitled “The Impact of Coercion on Financial Transaction,” 
prepared by Mohammad Mahmud al-Mohammad, published in The Social 
Studies Journal, Issue 12, July-December, 2001 AD. 
This study adopts a descriptive approach, using the deductive and analytical 
approaches to clarify the meaning of consent and its impact on contracts. It then 
addresses the achievement of justice and consent, demonstrates some 
applications of jurisprudence (Fiqh), and offers some examples on the subject.  
 
The Lexical and Contextual Definition of a Contract  
The lexical meaning of a contract is “to attach and to fasten.”2  The lexical 
meaning is used in expressions such as “tying the rope,” and the metaphorical 
meaning is used in expressions such as “selling contract.” Also, oaths and vows 
may be parts of contracts that demonstrate confirmation and commitment.3  
In terms of a contract’s contextual meaning, some language scholars define 
a contract in a general way to include anything involving a human vow, whether 
                                                          
2  Ibn Manzūr, 'The Arab Tongue’ (Lisān al-ʿArab), 3\296. Ibn Fāris, Dictionary of 
Language Standards, 4\68. 
3 Ar-Razi, Mukhtār al-ṣiḥāḥ, 1\214. Az-Zubaidi, Mohammad bin Abd al -Razzaq, TajAl- 
A'roos min Jawaher Al-Qamous, 8\401. 
The Achievement of Both Justice and Consent in Financial Transaction Contracts 
Al-Qasemi Journal of Islamic Studies, volume 5, issue. 1 (2020), 5 
it be an individual intention, such as a divorce and oath, or an agreement between 
two people, such as a sale, lease, or mortgage.4  
However, most scholars have defined a contract in terms of its specific 
meaning, namely, an arrangement involving two intentions, which has both 
apparent and implicit qualities. The implicit quality is the agreement of the 
contractual intentions of both contractors, while the apparent wording is the offer 
and acceptance, which dictates that the contract cannot be accomplished unless 
there is mutual consent between both parties. Nevertheless, the consent is veiled 
and cannot be determined without proof. Thus, the apparent wording of offer and 
acceptance serves as proof of mutual consent between the two parties.5  
The Mecelle (Aḥkām-i ʿAdlīye) journal defines the making of a contract as 
“committing to and undertaking a thing or a situation, and it is a relation between 
offer and acceptance.”6 The contract is a legitimate relation between offer and 
acceptance, in which legitimacy is a condition that makes the contract valid.7  
The contract is a legal commitment between two parties as a result of 
consent in regard to their choices. The way hidden choices are revealed is by the 
contractors’ mutually expressing their choices through offer and acceptance. 
Whenever there are offer and acceptance under Sharia terms, there is a contract 
that expresses the consent of two parties concerning the issue at hand. Thus, each 
party becomes obligated to honor the rights of the other party under the contract.8  
 
                                                          
4 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Quran Provisions (Aḥkām al-qurʾān), 3\285. al-Qurtubi, Al-Jami li Ahkam 
al-Qur'an, 6\32. 
5 Al-Nawawī, Rawdat al-Talibeen, 4\229. 
6 Article 103 from Mecelle journal: Hiadar, drr alhakam shrh majlah al'ahakam, 1\105. 
7 Article 104 from Mecelle journal: Hiadar, drr alhakam shrh majlah al'ahakam, 1\105. 
8 Al-Zarqa, A General Introduction to Islamic Law,1\383. 
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The Definition of Consent and its Impact on Contracts  
The lexical meaning of consent is to express a favourable opinion or choice, such 
as I consent to [something], namely, I choose it.9 Consent and dissent are internal 
characteristics.10 Also, if two people consent to something, it means they agree 
on it.11  
What can be concluded from the statements of the majority of Sharia 
scholars is that the contextual meaning of consent is to intend to do something 
by choice.12  According to most scholars, consent and choice are synonyms, 
where the choice of the person is “his intention to do something with consent and 
desire and without forcing or coercion.”13  
The Ḥanafīs distinguished between choice and consent, stating, “Choice is 
to something and consent is to prefer something and favour it, therefore, if 
someone is forced on a thing then he chooses it but does not consent to it.”14  
Consent according to Ḥanafīs is to prefer something and not object to it, hence, 
it is more specific than choice; a person might choose something that he objects 
to, for instance, one might fight for self-defence and not out of a desire to fight.   
The preponderant opinion is what the majority of scholars have believed in, 
which is that there is no difference between consent and choice. Consent is 
                                                          
9 Al-Fayomi's, The Luminous Lantern, 1\229. 
10 Ibn Manzūr, 'The Arab Tongue’ (Lisān al-ʿArab), 14\323. 
11 Al-Zabīdī, Taj al-Arus ('The Bride's Crown from the Pearls of the Qamus (Dictionary), 
8\160. 
12  Al-Dasūqī, Hāshīyat al-Dasūqī, 3\3.Ar-Ramli, Nihayat Al-Mohtaj, 3\375. Al-
Mardawi: Al-Inssaf, 4\265 
13 As-Suyutti, al-Hawilil-fatawi, 2\166.  
14 Ibn 'Abidin, Radd al-Muhtār, 5\507. 
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“choosing something with intention knowing its consequences;”15 thus, consent 
is achieved by doing something with full intention. If intention is lacking, then 
the consent which is the basis of contracts is absent, and as a result, the contract 
is unreliable unless mutual consent is reached. Therefore, the verses of the Quran 
and Sunnah clarified that peoples’ money is made lawful only by bringing 
mutual consent and consent into effect -“O you who have believed, do not 
consume one another's wealth unjustly but only [in lawful] business by mutual 
consent”16- and the Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him) said, “Transactions 
may only be done by mutual consent.”17 
The Quranic verse and the Sunnah text clarify the importance of consent 
and mutual consent in contracts, in which it is prohibited to take property from 
someone without his consent. 18  Because consent is internal and cannot be 
perceived, the wording of a contract has been adopted to replace real implicit 
consent, as, on principle, it furnishes clear evidence of consent.19 The wording is 
the source of the contract, and there is no sign of lack of consent because the 
wording of offer and acceptance stands in for it, by which the ordinances of the 
worldly life are executed according to clear and explicit evidence that the 
judiciary can access.20 
However, a case on which Fiqh scholars differ concerns the absence of 
consent because of coercion. In this case, coercion is a reflection of an 
                                                          
15 Ali al-Qaradaghi, the principal of consent in contracts, 2\1006. 
16 Surat An-Nissa, verse 29.  
17 Ibn Majah, Sunan Ibn Majah, Trade chapter, section of sale with choice, 2\737, Hadith 
(2185), authenticated by al-Albani in Irwa al-Ghalil, 5\125, Hadith (1283).  
18 Ibn Mufliḥ, El-Mübdi', 4\7.Al-bahūtī, Kashshāf al-qinā', 3\149. 
19 An-Nawawi, Rawdat al-Talibeen, 4\229. 
20 Al-Zarqa, A General Introduction to Islamic Law, 1\384. 
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incompatibility between the wording and the consent and of the fact that the 
wording is not indicative of consent. Hence, according to the majority of Fiqh 
scholars, the contract is void, for they consider implicit consent the basis of all 
personal or transactional contracts, without distinguishing between contracts that 
can be terminated and those that cannot. If the contractor did not intend by his 
words or his actions to make a contract, then his utterance will be void and have 
no consequences, since real consent is absent.21 
Nevertheless, the Ḥanafīs considered the wording the only basis for a 
contract, and they differentiated between the contracts that can and cannot be 
terminated, for instance, sale and lease contracts, and marriage and divorce 
contracts. According to the Ḥanafīs, contracts that cannot be terminated do not 
only accept real implicit consent, but they need an utterance from an adult of 
sound mind; hence, it is valid without implicit consent, which is not a condition 
for the validity of the contract.22 In contrast, for the validity of contracts that can 
be terminated, implicit consent is important; however, it is not the only basis, or 
even a condition for their validity. A contract might be made under conditions of 
coercion that affect consent, but the contract itself may be considered false, due 
to the absence of real implicit consent.23 A false contract is a contract that has 
the right basis and conditions but lacks one of the conditions that make it valid. 
The unavailability of consent falsifies the contract, but does not void it, because 
if consent is achieved upon the removal of coercion, the contract again becomes 
valid.24  
                                                          
21 Al-Hattab, Mawaheb Al-Jaleel, 4\22. Ash-Sherbini Moghni Al-Mohtaj, 3\318. Al-
bahūtī, Kashshāf al-qinā', 3\149. 
22 Az-Zayla'I, Tabieen al-Haqae’q, 2\194.Ibn Mawdood, Al-Ikhtiyar, 2\106. 
23 Almargennani, Al-Hidaya, 3\272.  Al-Kashani, Bada'i' al-Sana'i', 6\128.  
24 As-Sarkhasi, Al-Mabsoot, 24\55. 
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Coercion and its Impact on Consent 
The lexical meanings of coercion are “forcing” and “compelling,” which goes 
against consent25; thus, coercion means forcing someone to do something using 
threats.26  
According to Fiqh scholars, the Ḥanafīs explained in detail the meaning of 
coercion, which eliminates consent and impacts the validity of a contract, 
whereas the majority of scholars define coercion in general terms. According to 
the Ḥanafīs, the meaning of coercion is “forcing someone to do something he 
refuses using threatening until he becomes scared to the extent of giving direct 
consent.”27  
The definition of coercion, according to an article (948) in Mecelle journal 
is “forcing someone to do something without right and consent.” The expression 
“without right” is precautionary, because rightful coercion is not considered 
coercion according to the definition of coercion in this article nor according to 
the definition given by the Ḥanafīs.28 
The majority of Fiqh scholars from the Mālikī, Shafi'I, and Hanbali 
schools29 defined coercion in general, and then they divided it into coercion 
without right and rightful coercion, whereby coercion without right is to violate 
someone’s free will unjustly in a way that eliminates consent and impacts the 
contract, and rightful coercion is coercion that is meant to achieve a lawful 
                                                          
25 Ar-Razi, Mukhtār al-ṣiḥāḥ 1\269 
26 Al-Zabīdī,Taj al-Arus The Bride's Crown from the Pearls of the Qamus 
(Dictionary),36\435. 
27 A'la Eddeen Al-Bukhari, Kashf Al-Asrar a'n Osool Fakhr al-Islam Al-Bazdawi, 4\383 
28 Hiadar, drr alhakam shrh majlah al'ahakam, 2\659. 
29 Al-Dasūqī, Hāshīyat al-Dasūqī, 2\145, Ash-Sherbini, Moghni Al-Mohtaj, 2\333, Al 
Uthaymeen, 'Al-Sharh al-Mumti, 8\109. 
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purpose, in which the consent of the legislator replaces the consent of the 
contractor. That is because it is the compulsion to perform an obligatory deed 
that the compelled has refrained from doing, and it is set by the judge in a way 
that achieves justice, dispels trouble, and restores peoples’ rights. 
 
Achieving Both Justice and Consent in Financial Transaction Contracts 
We clarified above that coercion that eliminates consent and affects the contract 
is illegitimate coercion that unjustly attacks the free will of others, while rightful 
coercion is legal coercion that does not affect or negate the provisions of the 
contract.30 Thus, Fiqh scholars have agreed on the validity of a contract involving 
a rightfully compelled contractor. They also have agreed on the fact that the 
wording of a contract cannot be affected by this kind of coercion because the 
consent of the legislator replaces the consent of the rightfully compelled 
contractor. Hence, the Ḥanafīs stated that rightful coercion does not interfere 
with the rights of the compelled contractor and does not eliminate his legal free 
choice.31 
The Mālikīs also stated that rightful coercion has the same status as 
voluntary consent, since it is a type of lawful coercion that makes the contract 
valid.32  
 The Shafi'is also stated that rightful coercion does not terminate judgment 
on the actions of those under contract, so that an action that is forced is the same 
as an action of voluntary consent, since the consent of the legislator replaces the 
consent of the contractor.33 
                                                          
30 Al-Qaradaghi, The Principal of Consent in Contracts, 2\1279. 
31 Ibn Amir Hajj, Al-Taqrirwa al-Tahbbir 2\207. 
32 Al-Khurshi, Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil, 4\34. 
33 Ash-Sherbini, Moghni Al-Mohtaj, 2\333 
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The Hanbalis also stated that rightful coercion preserves the validity of the 
contract because it is a legitimate way to attain rights without injustice and 
discretion.34  
As the Fiqh scholars of the four religious schools of Islamic jurisprudence 
stated, Islamic Sharia achieves a balance between justice and consent. Islamic 
Sharia does not approve a contract that forces the contractor to do something he 
has never agreed to, except for that which is he is obligated to do by the rules of 
justice and interest or by the compulsory contracts issued by the state to achieve 
justice. Rightful coercion in these cases is considered necessary to achieve both 
justice and consent in the contracts.35  
The principle of consent in Islamic jurisprudence is the basis of a legitimate 
contract, unless it leads to injustice or causes damage. This means that in Islamic 
Sharia, mutual consent should be restricted to not causing injustice and damage 
to others. Thus, if consent or mutual consent leads to damage or helps the 
oppressor to increase his oppression, the principle of consent is invalidated. 
However, another principle should be implemented, which is that of rightful 
coercion, because it is not acceptable to take consent as an excuse for actions that 
lead to injustice and damage. That is because the wise legislator issues judgments 
positively or negatively with the public’s best interest in mind.36  
When the right of the individual leads to oppression or harm, the state has 
to intervene and stop it; hence, the compelling of a contract becomes a right for 
the state that is authorized by the wise legislator to eliminate oppression or to 
achieve the public’s best interest.37 This means the state can intervene in an 
                                                          
34 Al Uthaymeen, 'Al-Sharh al-Mumti, 8\109. 
35 Al-Zarqa, A General Introduction to Islamic Law, 1\538. 
36 Ad-Durini, contrastive studies in the fundamentals of Islamic Jurisprudence, 1\580, 
37 Ministry of Awqaf, Kuwaiti Encyclopedia of Islamic Jurisprudence, 1\313. 
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actual right that is revealed by Allah within the limitations set by the legislator. 
These limitations are bounded by the necessity to secure the public interest and 
eliminate corruption and exploitation from society. This intervention does not 
mean attacking the consent right unjustly; however, it means that the state has 
the power to coordinate conflicting rights and give preponderance to the public’s 
best interest. Otherwise, the conflict between rights will predominate, and the 
best interest for all will be wasted, which is rejected by Sharia and its purposes 
and conflicts with Sharia’s arbitrary rules.38  
The provisions of a contract are not enforceable if there is unrightful 
coercion, because the compeller practices injustice against the compelled. 
However, rightful coercion is the complete opposite; it is a legal action by which 
the compeller intervenes to achieve justice; thus, the provisions can be enforced 
to eliminate injustice and achieve justice.39 Therefore, the state has the right to 
compel the parties to a contract on every circumstance that is more likely will 
lead to injustice if there was not coercion.  
Islamic Fiqh provides enough evidence and applications in branches of 
jurisprudence to make the principle of achieving both justice and consent a 
general meaningful principle. The legislator grants the ruler broad authority in 
assessing the procedures and the means to be followed to achieve justice and 
pursue the public’s best interest; otherwise, the ruler would be considered 
negligent in his duties.40  
  
                                                          
38 Ad-Durini, The Extent of the Power of the State that Restrict the Truth, 228.  
39 Ibn al-Qayyim, At-Turuq al-Hukmiyah, 207. 
40 Ash-Shatibi, al-I'tisam, 2\619. Ad-Durini, contrastive studies in the fundamentals of 
Islamic Jurisprudence, 1\562. 
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Applications on the Achievement of both justice and Consent: 
The applications on the achievement of both justice and consent in the branches 
of Islamic Fiqh form a realistic and fundamental rule for the policy of just 
legislation. That is because it gives the state broad authority to achieve justice 
and eliminate harm and restores people’s rights. 
Some of the examples of applications: compelling a procrastinating debtor 
to sell his assets to pay back his debt; forcing a mortgagor to sell the mortgage if 
the debt becomes due and he still abstains from paying; compelling someone, at 
the demand of one of the parties, to sell property that cannot be divided or might 
suffer damage upon being divided, since this would violate the interest of the one 
making the demand; forcing the owner of a water supply to sell to people in need 
whatever exceeds his needs; forcing someone to sell at cost food that exceeds his 
needs; compelling a monopolist on sell products that he monopolizes at one-
eighth of the price; regulating extravagant prices if there is a public need for the 
goods; compelling someone to sell private property to serve the public interest, 
such as selling a plot of land to broaden a street or build a mosque, and so forth.   
This study cannot address all of these examples; therefore, it will have to do 
to clarify only one, the issue at hand, which is coercing a procrastinating debtor 
to sell assets to pay back his debt.  
Islamic legislation distinguishes between the affluent debtor and the 
indigent debtor. On one hand, if the debtor is poor, then not repaying a debt in 
time is not considered procrastination and injustice;  instead he should be given 
time to acquire the means or should receive charity, as Allah the Almighty has 
said, “If someone is in difficult circumstances, then defer until a time of ease. 
But to remit it as charity is better for you - if you only knew".41 
                                                          
41 Surat al-Baqarah, verse 280. 
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On the other hand, if the debtor is rich and can repay the debt, but 
procrastinates and abstains from paying due debts, then this is forbidden and is 
considered unjust.42 In this case, there is a set of procedures that the state has to 
follow to eliminate this injustice and to end the procrastination and rescue the 
lender from harm. These procedures are examples of the achievement of both 
justice and consent, and Fiqh scholars have agreed on the legality of coercion to 
force the borrower to pay the debt. They also agreed on coercion to contract to 
pay the debt; however, they disagreed on a third procedure, that the state could 
confiscate and sell the property of the debtor to pay his debt. The procedures are 
clarified as follows: 
1. If the debtor owns an asset that is of the same kind as that of the debt he 
owes, then Fiqh scholars agree that the state has a legal right to compel him 
to pay his debt; therefore, the state can take part of the debtor’s money by 
force and pay it to the creditor.43  
2.  If a procrastinating debtor has assets that are not of the same kind as those 
of the debt, the state can compel him to sell part of his propriety to pay his 
debt. Fiqh scholars have agreed on the validity of the sale contract in regard 
to this coercion because it is rightful coercion. The Ḥanafīs stated, “If the 
judge has compelled the debtor to sell some of his assets then his sale is 
legitimate.44” According to the Mālikīs, there is “[l]awful coercion such as 
the judge compelling the debtor to sell his property to the creditors.45” 
                                                          
42 Al-Qarāfī, Ad-Dhakira, 8\160. An-Nawawi, al-Minhag, 10\227. IbnḤajar, Fatḥ al-
Bārī, 1\189. 
43 Ibn 'Abidin, Radd al-Muhtār, 5\380. al-Qarāfī, Ad-Dhakira, 8\213, Ash-Shirazi, Al-
Mohazab, 2\113.  Al-bahūtī, Kashshāf al-qinā', 3\418. 
44 DamadAfandi, Majma' al-Anhur, 2\430. 
45 Al-Hattab, Mawaheb Al-Jaleel, 4\252. 
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According to the Shafi'is, rightful coercion has no impact on the illegality of 
the sale, as evidenced by reference to “the validity of the sale of the debtor 
who is compelled by the judge to sell his assets to pay his debts.” 46 
According to the Hanbalis, “If the debtor was rightfully compelled by the 
judge to sell his assets to pay his debts, then his sale is valid.”47 
3.  If the debtor hesitates to sell some of his property to pay his debt, Fiqh 
scholars disagree over whether it is legal for the state to sell the debtor’s 
property on his behalf. Whereas Abu Ḥanīfa considers this procedure to be 
illegal, the majority of scholars from the Mālikī, Shafi'I, and Hanbali 
schools, and other scholars from Ḥanafī’s school, considered it to be legal.48  
Abu Ḥanīfa believes that the power of the state over the debtor who has 
assets of a kind different from that involving the debt is limited to attempting to 
compel him to sell some of his property on his own in order to pay his debts. The 
state might jail him and keep him imprisoned until he sells on his own; however, 
Abu Ḥanīfa believes that the state’s selling of the debtor’s property is an 
interdiction on the debtor and should not be practiced because it invalidates his 
competency and is considered awful, as it cannot be seen to eliminate a particular 
harm.49 Also, Abu Ḥanīfa believes that the selling of the debtor’s assets by the 
state is a transaction without mutual consent, which is different from jailing the 
debtor, because compelling the debtor to sell his property himself involves an 
explicit acceptance by the debtor, by which the apparent wording that is the basic 
element of the contract is revealed. The rightful coercion in this instance does 
                                                          
46 As-Suyutti, Al Ashbah Wa Al Nazair, 211. 
47 Al-Shaibani, nayl al-matalib fi Sharḥ Dalil al-talib, 1\333. 
48 As-Sarkhasi, Al-Mabsoot, 14\164.Al-Khurshi, Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil, 5\271. Ash-
Shirazi, Al-Mohazab, 2\113. Ibn Mufliḥ, El-Mübdi', 4\296. 
49 Ibn Amir Hajj, Al-Taqrirwa al-Tahbbir 2\207 
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not affect consent and does not eliminate choice, so that the apparent wording, 
in this case, serves as the consent.50 However, if the state sells the debtors assets, 
there is no explicit acceptance by the debtor; thus, there is no apparent wording 
that serves as consent, which leads to a transaction without mutual consent.51  
The majority of scholars considered that procrastination on the part of a rich 
debtor justifies interdicting his money, so that if his procrastination is proved to 
the judge and his creditors request the judge to sell his assets and pay his debts, 
then the judge can sell some of the debtor’s assets by force to pay the exact 
amount of the debt.52 Since the procrastination of the rich debtor is an unjust act 
that should be prevented, for the debtor himself could sell some assets to pay his 
debt and undo the injustice, and the state should compel him to do so. 
Nevertheless, if the debtor refuses to sell by himself, the state can sell on his 
behalf, because the payment of a debt is a duty, and whatever it is necessary to 
do to fulfill a duty is also a duty, so if the debt can be paid only by selling, then 
the sale is a duty,53 whether this is by the debtor himself or by the state on his 
behalf if he refuses to sell on his own. 
The preponderant opinion one that the majority of scholars hold because 
Abu Hanifa agreed with them on the validity of the coercing the debtor to sell 
some of his property himself to pay off his debt, and agreed that this coercion is 
rightful and does not affect consent nor eliminate choice; instead, he saw it as 
legitimate to jail the debtor until he sells some of his assets by himself. The basic 
principle is that the debtor agrees to the legality of the state’s selling some of his 
                                                          
50 Damad Afandi, Majma' al-Anhur, 2\430. 
51 Al-Kāsānī, Bada'i al-Sana'I, 7\169. 
52As-Sarkhasi, Al-Mabsoot, 24\146, al-Dasūqī, Hāshīyat al-Dasūqī, 3\265, al-Haytami's 
Tuhfat al-Muhtaj, 10\206, Ibn Qudamah, Al-Kaafi, 2\96. 
53 Al-Subki, Al-Ashbāhwa'l-naza'ir, 2\88. 
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property to pay the debt, because the result is the same, and because the judge’s 
procuration in such cases replaces the seller’s consent. 
 
Conclusion  
This research produced important results, one of which is that the basic principle 
in Islamic Sharia is that a contract can only be valid if it is based on the mutual 
consent of both contracting parties, and on the principle that property shall not 
be taken from a person without his consent. The indication of mutual consent is 
the apparent wording of offer and acceptance under the condition of the absence 
of any coercion that might compromise consent. Such coercion is is illegal 
coercion, which is unjust and which unlawfully infringes the rights of others to 
exercise free will. 
According to the majority of Fiqh scholars, this means that unjust coercion 
is an attack against the will that eliminates consent, and thus makes a contract 
null and void, and according to Hanafi, makes it false in contracts that accept 
annulment and valid in contracts that do not.  
As for the rightful coercion, it is legitimate coercion by legal provision, in 
which the consent of the legislator replaces the consent of the contractor, because 
it is coercion to fulfill a duty that the contractor refrains from doing, and the 
judge is entitled to do this to the extent that it achieves justice, eliminates 
injustice, and prevents damage. 
The study also concludes that Islamic legislation combines and balances 
justice and consent; however, it did not address contracts that obligate a person 
with a mandate that he did not consent to, except in terms of the rules of justice 
and the public interest, such as imposing compulsory contracts to achieve right 
and justice. Therefore, the coercion of right in such cases is one of the necessary 
supports of fair legislation and country development. 
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Research has shown that in Islamic jurisprudence, there are applications and 
examples in the branches that make the principle of achieving both justice and 
consent a general moral principle that the legislator has observed in the 
provisions for these issues. The legislator gave the ruler broad powers to 
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